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PROBLEMS OF PROOF: THE FUNCTION AND APPLICA-
TION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN LOUISIANA
From its inception the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has pro-
duced conflict, confusion, and doubt.' The phrase had its birth
during argument of an ordinary negligence case, but develop-
ments in subsequent years have added a special meaning not
originally intended. 2 Basically, however, the application of res
ipsa loquitur differs very little from proof of negligence by in-
ference from circumstantial evidence3 which is employed in the
vast majority of tort cases. 4
In order to make out a successful tort action the plaintiff
must show that the defendant breached some duty owed to the
plaintiff and that this breach caused the plaintiff's injuries.5
Failure to produce evidence of the breach inevitably results in
a dismissal, but inability to produce direct evidence of the breach
will not preclude recovery.6 If plaintiff can show sufficient facts
from which it may reasonably be inferred that the defendant
conducted himself in a negligent manner and that this conduct
caused the injury, recovery is allowedT The application of res
1. "If that phrase had not been in Latin, nobody would have called it a prin-
ciple." Lord Shaw in Ballard v. North British Ry., Sess. Cas. ILL. 43, 56 (1923).
Dean Prosser would prefer that this "tag," which leads only to confusion, be con-
signed to the "legal dustbin." Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REV. 241, 271 (1936), quoting Bond, C.J., dissenting in
Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 40, 152 AtI. 633, 636 (1930):
" 'It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly expressed
for us in* English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions. It does not rep-
resent a doctrine, is not a legal maxim, and is not a rule.' " For a collection of
some of the many writings on the subject, see Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in
Texas, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 255, n.4 (1948) ; Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali-
fornia, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183, n.2 (1949).
2. According to Dean Prosser the phrase is an offspring of a casual word of
Pollack, B., with counsel in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299
(Ex. 1863). See Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
183 (1949). See also Morris, Res Ip8a Loquitur in Texas, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 255
(1948).
3. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference -A Discussion of the
Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 71-72 (1941) [hereinafter cited Malone].
4. Malone 71.
5. PRossER, TORTS § 30 (3d ed. 1964).
6. Id. at 216.
7. Footprints in the snow provide the simplest illustration of circumstantial
evidence: from the mere existence of such footprints it is reasonable to infer that
someone has recently crossed the area. By contrast, direct evidence exists if an
eye witness can testify that he saw someone cross the area. The footprints would
have probative value of the passage notwithstanding the declaration of several
witnesses that they saw no one cross the area. See id. § 39. Where there is direct
evidence of defendant's conduct, it must be determined merely, whether such con-
duct was substandard before the plaintiff can recover. Where, however, the
evidence is circumstantial, the existence of alleged substandard conduct must
first be inferred by weighing the probabilities of existence versus nonexistence,
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ipsa loquitur embodies this process of inferential reasoning, re-
vealing a recognition that it is unjust to deny a plaintiff any
possibility of recovery when the nature of his injury speaks
strongly of negligent causation aiid circumstances are sufficient
to attribute this negligent causation to the defendant.8 The dif-
ference between application of res ipsa loquitur and the usual
proof of negligence by inference thus appears to be one of de-
gree rather than of kind.9 This Comment seeks to show that the
Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes the underlying purpose and
nature of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur while articulating its
application in terms of the traditional elements of the doctrine.
I. TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Res ipsa loquitur - usually understood as "the thing speaks
for itself"' 0 -generally is applied if there is no evidence to
show negligence other than the fact that injury occurred under
circumstances which indicate negligent causation.1 ' In attribut-
ing this negligent causation to the defendant courts generally
refer to certain time-honored elements 12 and proceed to decide
based on other facts presented, and then the conduct must be evaluated to deter-
mine if it was substandard. See generally id. §§ 36, 39.
8. See Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Malpractice Law-Ex-
pansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. REV. 251 (1962).
9. See Malone 72.
10. For a historical development, see Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas,
26 TEXAS L. REv. 257 (1948); Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 183 (1949) ; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
20 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1936).
11. There seems to be no definite criterion to determine exactly what the
"res" in res ipsa loquitur is for all cases; normally it is regarded as a limited
fact group from which an inference of negligence is drawn by reason of the
particular circumstances of the plaintiff's injury. For a distinction between the
res ipsa loquitur situation and the negligence situation where proof is made by
circumstantial evidence, see Malone 72-74.
The proper function of res ipsa loquitur appears to have been recognized in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 328D, comment b at 40 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1960) : "Negligence and causation, like other facts, may be proved by circum-
stantial evidence. Without resort to Latin, the jury may be permitted to infer,
when a runaway horse is found in the highway, that its owner has been negli-
gent in'looking after it; or when a driver runs down a visible pedestrian, that
he has failed to keep a proper lookout. When the Latin phrase is used in such
eases, nothing is added. A res ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one kind
of case of circumstantial evidence, in which the jury may reasonably infer both
negligence and causation from the mere occurrence of the event itself and the
defendant's relation to it."
12. The "final development" of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is said to
have occurred when Dean Wigmore sought to define what a res ipsa loquitur
case -was in words which intimated a "formula" for its application in 4
WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 2509 (1st ed. 1905). Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali-fornia, 37 CALI . L. REV. 183, 187-88 (194 9). This "formulary" or elemental
Criterion has been referred to as the "orthodox" statement of res ipsa loquitur.
Car'penter, The Doctrine of Res IPsa Loquitur, I U. CHL, L. REv. 519 520
(1934). .... Lqir1U C. ..5..2
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the case according to their presence or absence. Following this
approach Louisiana courts have consistently held that to utilize
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the plaintiff must show that
(1) the accident is of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence, (2) the injury was caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the actual or constructive con-
trol of the defendant, and (3) evidence of the full cause of the
accident is more readily accessible to the defendant.13 While
the Louisiana courts seem to apply res ipsa loquitur only when
these three elements are present, it appears that they actually
look for the most plausible cause or explanation of the plain-
tiff's injury and use these artificial criteria as a means of either
connecting defendant with plaintiff's injury or exonerating
him. 14
(1) The Inference That the Accident Is Due to
Negligent Causation
The first accepted requirement for application of res ipsa
loquitur is that the accident must be one which common knowl-
edge indicates does not ordinarily occur in the absence of neg-
ligence. 15 This requirement, which assumes that trier of fact has
such "common" or ordinary knowledge of everyday events, is
consistent with the fundamental principle of circumstantial evi-
dence that there must be sufficient basis in fact to conclude
that one probability is more reasonable than another. 16 Hence,
res ipsa loquitur is usually applied to cases in which past ex-
perience of ordinary events forms a fund of common knowledge
from which the court draws to conclude that negligence was
13. Practically all the Louisiana cases applying res ipsa loquitur mention
these three factors. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Allain, 226 La. 788, 793,
77 So. 2d 395, 397 (1954) is illustrative: "It is well established in the Louisiana
jurisprudence that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must be applied to a case
if the accident which damaged plaintiff was caused by an agency or instrumen-
tality within the actual or constructive control of the defendant, if the accident
is of a kind which does not occur in the absence of negligence, and if the evidence
as to the true explanation of the accident is more readily accessible to the de-
fendant than to the plaintiff."
14. Cf. Pilie v. National Food Stores, 245 La. 276, 158 So. 2d 162 (1963)
Larkin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 La. 544, 97 So. 2d 389 (1957),
noted 19 LA. L. REV. 336 (1957) ; Gershiner v. Gulf Ref. Co., 171 So. 399 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1936).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. 2 HARPFR & JAMES, TORTS § 19.5 (1956) ; cf. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur
in California, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183, 193 (1949) ; Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in
Texas, 26 TEXAS L. R v. 255, 260 (1948). See also Malone 73-79.
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more probably present than not;17 for example, the case of a
rear end collision occurring in broad daylight,"' or an automobile
swerving or running off the road for no apparent reason.19 In
such cases the court is sufficiently familiar with the events
surrounding accidents of this kind, as matters of ordinary ex-
perience, to conclude that the accident is one which warrants
an initial inference of negligence, even though the defendant
may later be exonerated by other factors considered. 20
On the other hand, proof of a type of injury which is as
easily attributable, under ordinary experience, to unavoidable
accident as it is to negligence does not tend to establish any-
one's negligence; for example, where lightning strikes a tele-
phone wire causing the telephone to crack in plaintiff's ear and
17. See Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183, 193
(1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 328D, Comment d at 41 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1960) ; cf. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.5, at 1079 (1956).
A suggestion has been made that as the accident becomes more freakish and
improbable, interrupting the usual current of events, it becomes easier for the
court to attribute the accident to negligent causation. See Malone 79. See also
Prosser, supra at 192; 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra, at 1082. This sugges-
tion appears best illustrated by the classic statement of the Mississippi court in
Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 500, 78 So. 365, 366 (1918) :
"We can imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human toes could not be
left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found in chewing tobacco, it seems
to us that somebody has been very careless." It seems reasonable to conclude
that a person, when drawing upon the fund of common knowledge made of past
experience, would not ordinarily encounter human toes while enjoying tobacco.
Consequently, a basic inference that someone has been "very careless" is reason-
able under these circumstances. For other examples, see Vogt v. Hotard, 144
So. 2d 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (tree fell on plaintiff) ; Hawayek v. Sim-
mons, 91 So. 2d 49 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956), noted 18 LA. L. REV. 364 (1958)
(fishing lure in eye) ; Yates v. Williams, 32 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947)
(unattended automobile roaming street).
18. See Loprestie v. Roy Motors, Inc., 191 La. 239, 185 So. 11 (1930).
19. See, e.g., Adams v. Spellman, 130 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961);
Levy v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 8 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1942); cf. Tymon v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 10 So. 2d 599 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1942) ; see also Yates v. Williams, 32 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
20. See, e.g., Larkin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 La. 544, 97
So. 2d 389 (1957) (overturned automobile; other reasonable causes than defend-
ant's negligence not eliminated) ; Turner v. Continental Southern Lines, Inc.,
161 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (other probable causes than building
owner's negligence not eliminated) ; Fourroux v. Security Co., 144 So. 2d 566
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (other probable causes not eliminated) ; Bauer v.
Columbia Cas. Co., 126 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (plaintiff's own acts
not eliminated as probable cause) ; Williams v. Barton, 81 So. 2d 22 (La. App.
2d. Cir. 1955) (overturned bus; other probable causes) ; Peranio v. Superior Ins.
Co., 76 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (sudden emergency; LA. R.S. 32:234
(1950) eliminated defendant's negligence from consideration as probable cause) ;
Guiteau v. Southern Parking Co., 49 So. 2d 880 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) (in-
tervention of third party eliminated defendant's negligence as probable cause);
Hebert v. General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 48 So. 2d 107 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1950) (presence of plaintiff in car prevented inference that most probable
cause was defendant's negligence).
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resulting in injury to his hearing.2 1 Refusal to apply res ipsa
loquitur on the mere showing of these facts is understandable.
There is no basis in fact to warrant an inference of negligence
as a matter of probabilities. It is no more likely that the accident
occurred as the result of defendant's negligence than because
of factors over which defendant had no control. If, however,
the plaintiff would introduce one additional fact, for example,
that certain lightning grounds reduce the risk of such an acci-
dent considerably, the court might then have sufficient basis
in fact to infer that the defendant did not take the additional
precautions that should have been taken for the protection of
telephone users, and a different result might be obtained. 22
In many types of injuries arising out of specialized activities,
it is likewise difficult, if not impossible, for the court to isolate
any probable negligence without some knowledge of the prob-
able cause; for example, where a person is severely burned while
undergoing X-ray treatment.23 Until the court has sufficient
technical knowledge of the factors which produce such burns,
it cannot grasp the problem sufficiently to allow an inference
of negligence from the mere existence of the injury.24 In these
cases the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur serves no practical pur-
pose, since the plaintiff must acquaint the court with the factors
pertinent to the probable cause of the injury. The application of
a Latin formula does not result in a special inference that would
not ordinarily be drawn under the usual rules of circumstantial
evidence. 2.
It is never enough, however, for the plaintiff to prove he
was injured by the negligence of someone. The plaintiff must
also establish sufficient facts to provide a reasonable basis for
21. Burdett v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 72 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1954).
22. Cf. Ledet v. Lockport Light & Power Co., 132 So. 272 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1931).
23. See Lett v. Smith, 6 La. App. 248 (1927), where res ipsa loquitur was
not applicable on ground that mere occurrence of this type of injury does not
warrant inference of negligence, but evidence was sufficient to show specific
negligence.
24. See ibid. See also Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La.: 618,
73 So. 2d 781 (1953) ; Jacobs v. Beck, 141 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
. 25. See Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 73 So. 2d 781
(1953) ; Jacobs v. Beck, 141 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Lett v. Smith,
6 La.' App. 248 (1927) ; cf. Roark v. Peters, 2 La. App. 448 (2d Cir.. 1925). But
see'Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). For a criticism of
application of res ipsa loquitur to malpractice cases see Rubsamen, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in California Malpractice Law-Ewpansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting
Point, 14 STANf. L. Re-v. 251 (1962).
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the court to conclude that the defendant's negligence is the most
plausible explanation for the accident.26 To spin this web of
circumstantial evidence the courts have required the plaintiff
to show the additional fact that the agency or instrumentality
which caused 27 the injury was within the control of the defend-
ant, thus making it more reasonable for the court to look to the
defendant for an explanation.
(2) Control of the Instrumentality in the Defendant
The Louisiana courts have stated that res ipsa loquitur ap-
plies only if the instrumentality causing the harm was within
the control of the defendant. 28 Certainly it is true that if the
accident is one which does not ordinarily occur in the absence
of negligence and the defendant can be shown to have had con-
trol of the instrumentality causing the injury at the time of the
accident, it is very likely that his negligence was the cause of
the accident; but to apply the control element as a rigid formula
could lead to questionable results. In a Rhode Island case, for
example, plaintiff, sitting down in a chair which collapsed in
defendant's department store, was denied recovery on the ground
that plaintiff was in "control" of the chair at the time of the
injury.2 9 Such a rigid application of the criterion of control by
the defendant overlooks the very purpose for which the element
of control was designed. Control of the instrumentality by the
defendant is merely one effective way of reasonably and fairly
connecting the defendant with the negligent causation of the
plaintiff's injury.30 Consequently, it should be enough that de-
26. Cf., e.g., Pilie v. National Food Stores, 245 La. 276, 158 So. 2d (1963)
Larkin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 La. 544, 97 So. 2d 389 (1957)
Fourroux v. Security Co., 144 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Bauer v.
Columbia Cas. Co., 126 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) ; Monroe v. H. G.
Hill Stores, 51 So. 2d 645 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; Lognion v. Peters, 44 So. 2d
381 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) ; Fitzgerald v. Big Chain Stores, 22 So. 2d 133
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
27. It is axiomatic that the plaintiff must satisfy the court that a causal
connection exists between the defendant's negligence and the injury. This re-
•quirement is not relaxed in the res ipsa loquitur case but must be satisfied by a
preliminary showing through positive evidence that if defendant was negligent in
some manner, this negligence caused plaintiff's injury. See Malone 74-75. Accord,
Bourgon v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ;
see, also Langlinais v. Geophysical Serv., Inc., 237 La. 585, 111 So. 2d 781
(1959)..
28. See note 13 supra.
29. Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932).
30 The proper function of the control requirement in applying res ipsa loquitur
Appears to be recognized by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TOR TS § 328D, com-
ment g at 42 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960) : "The plaintiff may sustain [his] burden
of proof with the aid, of a:second inference, based upon a:.showing of specific
19651
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fendant has the right of control and the opportunity or responsi-
bility of exercising it,31 or shares this responsibility. 2 For ex-
ample, if defendant obtains, arranges, and installs ropes for
use in felling a tree, and plaintiff, acting on defendant's instruc-
tions, is injured by the falling tree, the court will properly look
to the defendant for an explanation of the accident, if the plain-
tiff can eliminate other probable causes.3 3  The defendant will
be held responsible, not because the second element of a Latin
maxim was met, but because the fact that defendant has re-
sponsibility for controlling the apparatus in the undertaking
makes it all the more reasonable to infer defendant's negligence
as the most plausible explanation of the accident.
If control of the instrumentality is merely one method of
linking defendant with plaintiff's injury, there is no logical
necessity for showing actual control if a nexus can be estab-
lished in some other way. Fortunately, the Louisiana courts
cause for the event which was within the defendant's responsibility, or a showing
that the defendant is responsible for all reasonably probable causes to which the
event can be attributed. Usually this is done by showing that a specific instru-
mentality which has caused the event or all such instrumentalities or reasonably
probable causes were under the exclusive control of the defendant. Thus the
responsibility of the defendant is proved by eliminating that of any other person.
"It is not, however, essential to the inference that the defendant have exclu-
sive control; and exclusive control is merely one way of proving his responsibility.
He may be responsible, and the inference may be drawn against him, where he
shares the control of another, as in the case of the fall of a party wall which
each of two defendants is under a duty to inspect and maintain. He may be
responsible where he is under a duty to the plaintiff which he cannot delegate
to another, as in the case of a landlord who leases premises dangerous to persons
on the public highway, which his tenant undertakes to maintain. He may be
responsible where he is under a duty to control the conduct of a third person,
as in the case of a host whose guests throw objects from his windows. It may be
enough that the defendant was formerly in control, at the time of the probable
negligence, as in the case of a beverage bottler whose product poisons the con-
sumer, when there is sufficient evidence to eliminate the responsibility of inter-
mediate dealers. Exclusive control is merely one fact which establishes the re-
sponsibility of the defendant; and if it can be established otherwise, exclusive
control is not necessary to a res ipsa loquitur case. The essential question be-
comes one of whether the probable cause of the injury is one which the defendant
was under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against."
Cf. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALiF. L. Rzv. 183, 201
(1949) : "It would be far better, and much confusion would be avoided, if the
idea of 'control' were to be discarded altogether, and if we were to say merely
that the apparent cause of the accident must be such that the defendant would
be responsible for any negligence connected with it."
31. See Gillis v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 95 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957) ; Mercer v. Tremont & G. Ry., 19 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944)
see also PRossaa, ToaTs § 39 (3d ed. 1964).
32. See Arrington v. Hearin Tank Lines, 80 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1955) ; Washington v. T. Smith & Son, 68 So. 2d 337 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) ;
cf. Dorman v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 223 La. 29, 64 So. 2d 833 (1953) ; see also
Paossma, ToRTS §39 (3d ed. 1964).
33. Vogt v. Hotard, 144 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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have avoided the questionable result reached in the Rhode Island
case34 and have apparently recognized the artificial nature of
the control element. Illustrative are the cases in which the court
has found sufficient evidence to infer negligence of defendant
as the most plausible explanation of the plaintiff's injury, al-
though defendant had parted with actual control or possession
of the instrumentality causing the hijury. In such cases the
court has found control and possession not an essential element;
for example, where a soft drink bottle explodes in the hands
of the plaintiff, 35 or a drum of acid leaks while in the hands
of a common carrier,3 6 or a plug in an acetylene cylinder breaks
while stored on plaintiff's premises, 37 or a rubber hose connec-
tion on an installed air conditioning unit breaks and causes
flooding of plaintiff's house.38 In these cases, however, the court
has required the plaintiff to eliminate equally reasonable ex-
planations of the accident, by showing that there was no tamper-
ing by anyone through whose hands the instrumentality passed
and that there was no fault on the part of the plaintiff himself.39
If such explanations are not eliminated 40 as probable causes,
34. Dean Prosser terms the result in Kilgore, supra note 29, an "absurdity."
Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183, 188 (1949).
35. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Thommassie, 293 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.
1961) ; Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works, 199 La. 599, 6 So. 2d 677 (1942);
Hudnall v. Travelers Ins. Co., 148 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Bonura
v. Barq's Beverages, 135 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Johnson v.
Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 63 So.2d 459 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953);
Boucher v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 46 So. 2d 701 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1950) ; Meyers v. Alexandria Coca Cola Bottling Co., 8 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1942) ; Lanza v. DeRidder Coca Cola Bottling Co., 3 So. 2d 217 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1941).
36. Motor Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131
So. 623 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
37. Hake v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 210 La. 810, 28 So. 2d 441 (1946).
38. Saunders v. Walker, 229 La. 426, 86 So. 2d 89 (1956) ; see also Plunkett
v. United Elec. Serv., 214 La. 145, 36 So. 2d 704 (1948) (heating unit installed
in plaintiff's house).
39. In virtually all cases where the instrumentality causing plaintiff's injury
has left the defendant's possession there is a discussion of this showing by plain-
tiff. See cases cited in notes 35-38 supra. Typical is the statement found in
Plunkett v. United Elec. Serv., 214 La. 145, 159, 36 So. 2d 704, 709 (1948):
"But the fact of possession and control by the defendant is not always an essen-
tial element. The doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] has been held to be applicable
in numerous actions where the offending articles were not possessed and con-
trolled by the defendants on the occurrence of the accidents such as those resulting
from exploding bottles of carbonated beverages, from leakage of drums of acid,
and from the blow out of a plug in a cylinder of acetylene gas. Important though
in actions of this class is that the plaintiff prove freedom of fault on the part
of all through whose hands the instrumentality passed after it left the defendant."
40. To require the plaintiff to negative his own fault has been criticized as
being contrary to the principle that contributory negligence is an affirmative
defense. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1939 Term
-Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 2 LA. L. REv. 89 (1939). Professor
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then the negligence of the defendant is simply not the most
plausible explanation of the accident. 41 If, however, the plain-
tiff can eliminate such equally reasonable causes, the only in-
quiries that should be made are whether the defendant had
control of the instrumentality at the time negligence most prob-
ably occurred,42 and whether defendant's duty of care extends
to plaintiff.4 3
(3) Evidence more Accessible to the Defendant
As part of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the Louisiana
courts have stated that evidence on the true cause of the ac-
cident must be more readily accessible to the defendant, or that
the defendant must have superior knowledge of the true cause
of the accident.44 This statement has been used as the principal
reason for allowing 45 or denying 46 recovery under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, but in truth it is difficult to accept this as
the sole and essential element upon which a res ipsa loquitur
case should turn. For example, in Yates v. Williams 47 plaintiff
was standing by a bus stop when he was struck by an un-
attended automobile rolling down an incline from a lot in which
defendant, a service station owner, parked automobiles. Defend-
ant admitted he was notified of the accident and had a customer
take plaintiff to a hospital but later declined to disclose owner-
ship of the automobile. The court, applying res ipsa loquitur,
Malone, however, takes the position that since the plaintiff's burden in a res ipsa
loquitur case is to show that the most plausible inference is the defendant's neg-
ligence, the plaintiff's fault should not be treated differently from any other com-
peting inference. Malone 105, n.98.
41. See, e.g., the following cases which have denied recovery under the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur because the plaintiff did not bear this burden of proof:
Monroe v. -1. G. Hill Stores, 51 So. 2d 645 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Piacun
v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 33 So. 2d 421 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948)
see also Pittman v. Gulotta, 25 So. 2d 343 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
42. See note 30 supra. See also Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Texas, 26 TExAS
L. RE v. 255, 268 (1948).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 328D (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960)
"Res Ipsa Loquitur. (1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff
is caused by negligence of the defendant when (a) the event is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible
causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently
eliminated by the evidence; (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff . See also note 30 supra; Malone 77.
44. See note 13 supra.
45. E.g., Yates v. Williams, 32 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) ; see also
Carter v. Middleton, 76 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
46. E.g., Lognion v. Peters, 44 So. 2d 381 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) ; see also
Gershner v. Gulf Ref. Co., 171 So. 399 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
47. 32 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
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gave judgment for the plaintiff, emphasizing that the defend-
ant had control of the automobile and had greater access to the
facts explaining why this automobile was rolling away, and that,
therefore, defendant should come forward with such informa-
tion and exculpate himself from the inference of negligence.
48
There can be no quarrel with the result in Yates. The service
s ation was on a slope; the defendant was obliged to know that
improperly attended automobiles sometimes roll down inclines,
and his duty of care obviously extended to plaintiff.49 The re-
sponsibility for seeing that the vehicles remained on the lot
rested on the defendant.5 ° Consequently, the fact that the auto-
mobile did roll down the incline made it reasonable to infer
under these circumstances that the mishap resulted from neg-
ligence of defendant. Whether defendant had superior knowl-
edge of the true cause would thus be virtually immaterial. By
not coming forth with the evidence he supposedly possessed on
the ownership of the car or other pertinent factors concerning
its venture, he was really declining to rebut the inference that
his negligence was the most probable cause of the plaintiff's
misfortune.51
To say that Yates stands for the proposition that liability
was imposed because of defendant's superior knowledge would
be to put an unusual premium on a plaintiff's ignorance. 2 Fur-
thermore, to require that the plaintiff must be without access
to evidence of the true cause of his injury before the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur can be applied is to intimate that the doc-
trine is an extraordinary legal device available only in an ex-
treme case.A' Such a view overlooks the very purpose of the
doctrine. Res ipsa loquitur serves only to point the finger of
responsibility at defendant by inference. An inference varies
in strength with the degree of probability, and an inference of
negligence will be raised by all the circumstances surrounding
48. Id. at 507.
49. The court in Yates did not even discuss this obvious fact and defendant
evidently did not seek to deny it.
50. There was some indication in the testimony that the lot was used indis-
criminately by the public as a parking lot, but the court in considering this point
said: "It is intimated by the testimony of some of the defendants that this park-
ing lot was used indiscriminately by the public but regardless of whether it was
or not the fact remains that it was used by the defendants to park the cars which
they serviced in their service station." Id. at 507.
51. Cf. Carter v. Middleton, 76 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
52. See 2 HARPE & JAMES, TORTS § 19.9, at 1095 (1956).
53. Malone 92.
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the accident, not merely by the ignorance of the plaintiff. 54
Accessibility to the evidence thus appears to serve no valid pur-
pose other than, perhaps, encouraging the parties with access
to the evidence to bring it before the court.
II. LOUISIANA APPLICATIONS- ROLE OF DEFENDANT'S DUTY
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been a part of the
Louisiana jurisprudence for at least half a century,5 and during
this period it has been applied to cases involving automobile
accidents,58 fires,57 explosions,58 exploding bottles,59 injuries sus-
54. Cf. Monkhouse v. Johns, 142 So. 347 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
55. The first reported Louisiana case in which res ipsa loquitur was applied
with any real significance appears to be Lykiardopolous v. New Orleans & C. R.
Light & Power Co., 127 La. 309, 53 So. 575 (1910) (plaintiff injured by explod-
ing boiler). For a comprehensive analysis of the application of res ipsa loquitur
as applied in Louisiana through the year 1941, see Malone 70.
56. See, e.g., Loprestie v. Roy Motors, Inc., 191 La. 239, 185 So. 11 (1938)
(rear end collision) ; Adams v. Spellman, 130 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961)
(auto swerved and hit parked car) ; Yates v. Williams, 32 So. 2d 505 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1947) (unattended automobile struck pedestrian) ; Levy v. Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North America, 8 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) (automobile left
road) ; Harrelson v. McCook, 198 So. 532 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) (automobile
left highway and went into ditch) ; Monkhouse v. Johns, 142 So. 347 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1932) (automobile ran off road and into tree) ; Lawson v. Nossek, 15 La.
App. 207, 130 So. 669 (2d Cir. 1.930) (guests of defendant injured in auto acci-
dent).
57. See, e.g., Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Allain, 226 La. 788, 77 So. 2d
395 (1954) (house caught fire when paint being removed with blowtorch) ; Plun-
kett v. United Elec. Serv., 214 La. 145, 36 So. 2d 704 (1948) (fire in home cen-
tral heating unit) ; Hake v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 210 La. 810, 28 So. 2d 441
(1946) (plug in acetylene cylinder blew out); Jones v. Shell Petroleum Corp.,
185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936) (plaintiff's building damaged by fire starting
in defendant's service station) ; Dotson v. Louisiana Cent. Lumber Co., 144 La.
78, 80 So. 205 (1918) (fire in defendant's sawmill killed employee); National
Sur. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 149 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) (fire
on front end loading equipment) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rittiner, 133 So. 2d 172
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (flash fire caused by hot tar) ; Carter v. Middleton, 76
So. 2d 594 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) (fire in truck spread to barn); New York
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. B. H. Prewitt & Sons, 55 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1951) (home furnace ignited floor finishing liquid) ; Letts v. Krause & Managan,
26 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) (home fire when varnish remover ignited) ;
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Temple, 187 So. 814 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (automobile caught
fire while defendant using blowtorch for repair) ; see also Gerald v. Standard Oil
Co., 204 La. 690, 16 So. 2d 233 (1943) (while unloading gasoline plaintiff lit
cigaret which ignited fumes; court said doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might be
applicable on remand).
58. See, e.g., Langlinais v. Geophysical Serv., Inc., 237 La. 585, 111 So. 2d
781 (1959) (dynamite blast ruptured levee) ; Watkins v. Gulf Ref. Co., 206 La.
942, 20 So. 2d 273 (1944) (oil well blew out) ; Lykiardopolous v. New Orleans &
C. R. Light & Power Co., 127 La. 309, 53 So. 575 (1910) (boiler explosion);
Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., 15 La. App. 603, 131 So. 709 (Orl. Cir.
1930) (deodorizing tank exploded killing nearby employee) ; Drago v. Dorsey, 13
La. App. 115, 126 So. 724 (Orl. Cir. 1930) (child crushed by falling fence due to
explosion of defendant's boiler). But see Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp.,
241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961) (boiler explosion but res ipsa loquitur held
inapplicable since cause of explosion fully established at trial).
59. See, e.g., cases cited note 35 supra.
1965] ;,./ COMMENTS
tained from falling objects,60 fishing lure in plaintiff's eye,6
leaking acid,62 drowning in a public pool, 8 and consumption of
foreign matter contained in foodstuffs . 4 These cases contained
factual situations in which the three elements of res ipsa loquitur
were ostensibly present, but in many instances application of
res ipsa loquitur appears to serve no useful purpose. In some
cases the defendant's duty was such that merely introducing
evidence of due care did not eliminate the defendant's negli-
gence as the most probable cause of the accident. For example,
in Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works65 plaintiff was injured by
flying glass from an exploding soft drink bottle just after its
delivery by defendants' employee. Plaintiff, invoking the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, showed that she herself was free
from fault and that there was no improper handling by anyone
else. Defendant countered with an impressive array of evidence
showing that only the most scientific and modern appliances
and methods were used in the bottling process.G6 The court, after
carefully considering all the evidence, allowed recovery under
60. Vogt v. Hotard, 144 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (tree fell on
plaintiff while helping defendant under latter's direction); Washington v. T.
Smith & Sons, 68 So. 2d 337 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953) (falling crate) ; Landry
v. News-Star-World Pub. Corp., 46 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) (metal
pipe fell from scaffolding) ; Mercer v. Tremont & G. Ry., 19 So. 2d 270 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1944) (railroad car wheel fell on plaintiff) ; Pizzitola v. Letellier Trans-
fer Co., 167 So. 158 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936) (bale of paper fell off truck) ;
Noble v. Southland Lumber Co., 4 La. App. 281 (2d Cir. 1926) (plank fell on
plaintiff in lumber yard) ; Lonatro v. Palace Theatre Co., 5 La. App. 386 (Orl.
Cir. 1926) (soft drink bottle fell from balcony in theater).
61. Hawayek v. Simmons, 91 So. 2d 49 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
62. Motor Sales & Serv. Co. v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 15 La. App. 353, 131 So.
623 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
63. Rome v. Landon & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America, 169 So. 132 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1936).
64. See, e.g., Mayerhefer v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 219 La. 320, 52
So. 2d 866 (1951) (soft drink with excessive iodine content) ; White v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 16 So. 2d 579 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943) (soft drink with deleterious
substance) ; Costello v. Morrison Cafeteria Co., 18 La. App. 40, 135 So. 245 (Orl.
Cir. 1931) (cream cheese unfit for human consumption served to plaintiff). But
aeo Rowton v. Ruston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 17 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1944) and Dye v. American Beverage Co., 194 So. 438 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940),
in which the court allowed recovery for drinking beverages with a deleterious sub-
stance contained therein making no mention of res ipsa loquitur, but indicating
that recovery was allowed on a theory of warranty. The Supreme Court, appar-
ently sensing the confusion, held in LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952) that plaintiff could recover for damages sus-
tained upon consuming a soft drink containing a deteriorated housefly on a theory
of implied warranty of fitness for human consumption. See notes 68-71 infra and
accompanying text.
65. 199 La. 599, 6 So. 2d 677 (1942).
66. The defendant showed that the bottles were purchased from a reputable
manufacturer and that gas gauges used in the bottling process prevented any ex-
cessive gas pressure in the bottles. See id. at 607, 6 So. 2d at 680.
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res ipsa loquitur saying: "Despite all this evidence the fact re-
mains that the bottle did explode. '67
The result in Ortego seems sound, since it appears that the
defendant in these "bottling cases" is held to more than showing
due care or even a high degree of care in the bottling process.0 8
When a bottled beverage explodes, the bottling company is con-
fronted with an almost irrefutable inference of negligence, so
that the result is, for all practical purposes, the same as that
which would be reached if a doctrine of warranty were applied 9
making the bottler virtually an insurer,70 like the purveyor of
beverages or food containing a deleterious substance.71
If injury results from defendant's use of explosives, 72 gas,73
electricity,74 or other highly dangerous substances 75 the court
has, not surprisingly, refused to allow any evidence of due care
by defendant to refute an inference of negligence.76 Illustrative,
perhaps, is Langlinais v. Geophysical Serv. Inc.77 Defendant,
acting under authority of an exploration permit from plaintiff,
set off a dynamite charge in a hole drilled to a depth of about
fifty feet at a spot on plaintiff's rice field. Less than an hour
and a half thereafter a portion of plaintiff's six foot high levee
collapsed. The point of collapse was about eight hundred and
twenty feet from the explosion. Plaintiff was able to show by
67. Id. at 608, 6 So. 2d at 680.
68. See notes 69-71 infra.
69. See LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d
873 (1952) ; Rowton v. Ruston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 17 So. 2d 851 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1944) ; Dye v. American Beverage Co., 194 So. 438 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1940) ; see also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953
Term -Torts, 14 LA. L. REV. 182 (1953).
70. See Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 810 (1963). Application of res ipsa loquitur to
these cases achieves no exceptional result when compared to other jurisdictions
which hold the bottling company to a strict liability upon a contractual theory
of implied warranty of fitness. See Note, 5 LA. L. REV. 344, 348 (1943) ; see also
Note, 13 LA. L. REV. 624 (1953).
71. LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873
(1952) ; see also Rowton v. Ruston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 17 So. 2d 851 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1944) ; Dye v. American Beverage Co., 194 So. 438 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1940).
72. See, e.g., Langlinais v. Geophysical Serv., Inc., 237 La. 585, 111 So. 2d
781 (1959) (dynamite).
73. See, e.g., Watkins v. Gulf Ref. Co., 206 La. 942, 20 So. 2d 273 (1944)
(oil well blew out).
74. Cf., e.g., Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, Light & Waterworks Co., 111 La.
522, 35 So. 731 (1903) ; Ledet v. Lockport Light & Power Co., 132 So. 272 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1931).
75. See, e.g., Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Allain, 226 La. 788, 77 So. 2d
395 (1954) (fire damage by blowtorch).
76. But see Davis v. Teche Lines, Inc., 200 La. 1, 7 So. 2d 365 (1942).
77. 237 La. 585, 111 So. 2d 781 (1959), noted 34 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1960).
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convincing circumstantial evidence that the collapse of the levee
and consequent flooding of his fields was caused by the ex-
plosion; but he did not attempt to introduce proof showing any
particular negligent conduct on the part of the defendant. The
defendant attempted to rebut the inference that his negligence
had caused the accident by showing that the methods used in
setting off the dynamite in no way varied from the usual and
customary procedure adopted in similar operations. The court
allowed recovery under res ipsa loquitur, stressing that the
occurrence itself remained as mute testimony contradicting de-
fendant's claim that only approved methods were used.
The refusal of the court in Langlinais to accept defendant's
evidence as sufficient to refute the inference that the defend-
ant's negligence was the most plausible explanation of the ac-
cident is perhaps more understandable when viewed in light of
the high duty that accompanies the use of such dangerous sub-
stances. Persons using dangerous instrumentalities will be re-
garded as virtual insurers for all damages causally attributed
to such use.78 Reliance on res ipsa loquitur in such cases adds
nothing to obtain a result that could not have been obtained
otherwise. At best, res ipsa loquitur is allowed to relieve the
plaintiff of the necessity of proving the details of negligence
because negligence is not such a serious issue. 79
If the ultimate question confronting the court, in a suit for
recovery under res ipsa loquitur, is whether the facts and cir-
cumstances of the accident suggest the negligence of the de-
fendant, rather than some other cause, as the most plausible
explanation of the accident, the extent of the defendant's duty
will certainly play an important role in obtaining an answer.
If a high degree of care is required (as evidently there is in
78. For example, the Louisiana courts have indicated an extremely high stand-
ard of care exists for users of electricity: "The fact that frequent inspections of
the line were made to ascertain the condition of the wires and remedy defective
insulation does not relieve the company of liability. If the span wire had become
dangerously charged with an electrical current the company's inspection should
have been thorough enough to have detected it. . . . It was its business to know
the span wire in question was a 'live' wire through leakage from the trolley which
it suspended." Potts v. Shreveport Belt Ry., 110 La. 1, 8, 34 So. 103, 105 (1903) ;
accord, Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, Light & Waterworks Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So.
731 (1903) ; Whitworth v. South Arkansas Lumber Co., 121 La. 894, 46 So. 912
(1908) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 667 (1870). For cases indicating similar high
degrees of care in other areas, see Malone 96. See also The Work of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term - Torts, 18 LA. L. REV. 63 (1957).
79. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term-
Torts, 9 LA. L. REV. 224, 226 (1949).
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the bottling cases and dangerous substances cases), then there
are more precautions which a defendant must take to prevent
an accident. This in turn will generate more reasonable hypo-
theses to support an inference of defendant's negligence. If,
on the other hand, there are fewer precautions that a defendant
must take, then there are fewer hypotheses upon which to
predicate an inference of defendant's negligence and the in-
ference is less likely to be drawn from the mere existence of the
accident. Illustrative of this, perhaps, is Pilie v. National Food
Stores.0 Plaintiff was shopping in a self-service store when
several bottles of soft drinks fell from a display, the shattered
glass lacerating plaintiff's foot. Plaintiff offered no affirma-
tive evidence of defendant's negligence and there was no evi-
dence that plaintiff was at fault. The Supreme Court refused
application of res ipsa loquitur, reasoning that there was not
sufficient basis in fact from which to infer that it was the
negligence of the defendant rather than the negligence of in-
dependent parties that caused the bottles to fall. In coming to
this conclusion the majority was evidently not satisfied that
negligence of the defendant was the most plausible explanation
of the accident.81 The concurring opinion felt that the presence
and activity of heavy road machinery outside the store could
well have vibrated the bottles loose.8 2 The dissents, however,
were of the opinion that it was the duty of the proprietor to
see that the patrons of his store will not be injured in using self-
service racks installed primarily for the owner's economy and
benefit.83 While the majority's conclusion that any one of the
several competing inferences could have reasonably been drawn
appears sound, this does not dispose of the issue, unless, as the
dissents pointed out, the proprietor is to be considered as not
coming under a duty to protect his patrons from such a risk.
Consequently, a preliminary inquiry into the duty of a proprietor
80. 245 La. 276, 158 So. 2d 162 (1963).
81. "[O]ur own jurisprudence is in accord with the view that each case must
be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and that res ipsa loquitur will not
be applied unless the facts and circumstances indicate that negligence of the de-
fendant, rather than the negligence of others, is the most plausible explanation of
the accident. Accordingly in answer to plaintiff's question of law, the facts and
circumstances of this case do not permit the application of res ipsa loquitur be-
cause from them we cannot draw the inference that it was [defendant's] negli-
gence, rather than the negligence of others, that causes the cartons to fall." Id.
at 287, 158 So. 2d at 166.
82. Id. at 298, 158 So. 2d at 170.




of business premises is required before a determination of
whether a plausible inference may be drawn.
The business guest, or invitee as he is sometimes called, is
entitled to assume that preparations have been made in the
premises for his safety. The proprietor of the premises, how-
ever, is not an insurer of the invitee's safety, but owes only a
duty of reasonable care such as the duty of reasonable periodic
inspections,8 4 and it is not negligence to leave bottled goods on
open display 5 unless such a display creates an unsafe condition
which a reasonable inspection would have disclosed. 6 Conse-
quently, the mere fact that the plaintiff was injured by a falling
bottle in Pilie does not raise any inference of negligence in
itself. However, had plaintiff been able to show the additional
factors that, for example, a considerable time had elapsed since
the defendant made any inspection, or that the vibrations from
the construction outside tended to create abnormal conditions
that should place a proprietor on notice that goods might fall
from shelves, then the fact of plaintiff's injury might have been
sufficient to raise an inference of negligence to allow recovery,
perhaps without any resort to res ipsa loquitur8 7
III. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is basically an application
of principles of circumstantial evidence. The traditional elements
that must be shown by a plaintiff who seeks to invoke the doc-
trine are merely factors by which the defendant may be so
closely connected with the fact of plaintiff's injury as to make
the inference that his negligence caused the injury more plausible
than any other.
To be able to conclude that a particular occurrence would
not have happened in the absence of negligence presupposes a
84. See PROSSER, TORTS § 61, at 402 (3d ed. 1964) ; accord, Landry v. News-
Star-World Pub. Corp., 46 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) ; Riche v. Thomp-
son, 6 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Bartell v. Serio, 180 So. 460 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1938) ; Farrow v. John R. Thompson Co., 137 So. 604 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1931) ; Theodore v. J. G. McCrory Co., 137 So. 352 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1931).
85. See Ellington v. Walgreen Louisiana Co., 38 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949).
86. See ibid.; cf. Joynes v. Valloft & Dreaux, Inc., 1 So. 2d 108 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1941).
87. See Ellington v. Walgreen Louisiana Co., 38 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949); see also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1963-1964
Term - Torts, 25 LA. L. REV. 334 (1965).
19651
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
fund of common knowledge of the probable causes from which
a basic inference of negligent causation may be drawn. As the
activity becomes more specialized, the mere occurrence of an
injury is no basis for any inference whatsoever, and, conse-
quently, additional technical information concerning probable
causes involved in such specialized activity must be brought be-
fore the court.
Once the initial inference of negligence is drawn, the finger
of responsibility may be pointed towards the defendant by show-
ing circumstances such as control by the defendant of the pre-
sumably most relevant factors at the time negligence probably
occurred. The plaintiff should not be required to show that the
defendant's negligence caused the injury beyond a reasonable
doubt, comparable to the state's burden of proof in criminal
cases. It is a question of probabilities, and the extent of de-
fendant's duty will play an important role in reducing the in-
quiry of the court's to a single one: do the facts and circum-
stances of the accident suggest negligence of the defendant,
rather than some other factors, as the most plausible explana-
tion of the accident?
James S. Holliday, Jr.
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